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Títol

Modeling International Agreements for Environmental Protection

Conferenciant

Dr Dritan Osmani

Professor/a organitzador/a

Institució

Data

16-03-2015 10:30

Resum

The stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) is analyzed by using game theory. The integrated assessment model FUND provides the cost-benefit payoff functions of pollution abatement for sixteen different world regions. The farsighted stability concept of Chwe (1994) is used and solved by combinatorial algorithms. The myopic stability concept of d'Aspremont et al. (1983) and farsighted stability of Chwe (1994) are discussed. Myopic stability assumes that players are myopic while farsighted stability assumes perfect foresight of the players and predicts which coalitions can be formed when players are farsighted. Farsightedly stable coalitions can be frequently the largest size stable coalition, that game theory without side payments can reach. All farsightedly stable coaltions and their improvement to environment are found.

Lloc

Lab 231

Idioma

Angls