# Deim Seminar

## Title

Secret Pure Correlation
## Conferenciant

Penelope Hernández
## Professor/a organitzador/a

## Institution

Universitat de València
## Date

27-01-2010 12:00
## Summary

We study the conditions in which a team guarantees a successful coordination against similar opponents. We consider a dynamical situation of a 3-players game in which each player is identied by his ability to implement strategies. If the team payo is the opposite to its opponent one, the optimal coordination is characterized by the value in correlated strategies of the zero-sum game associated. The ability of each player is related to the number of "simple" strategies; in particular, it is equal to the number of states of the smallest machine which implements a strategy of player i, i.e.: m_i. The main result states that if the ability of the team is large enough with respect to the ability of his adversary, there exists pure strategies that guarantee the value in correlated strategies. Therefore the pair of pure strategies blocks any strategy of the opponent with the strongest level of punishment.
## Place

Lab 231
## Language

Castellà