Deim Seminar
Title
Modeling International Agreements for Environmental Protection
Conferenciant
Dr Dritan Osmani
Professor/a organitzador/a
Institution
Date
16-03-2015 10:30
Summary
The stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) is analyzed
by using game theory. The integrated assessment model FUND provides the
cost-benefit payoff functions of pollution abatement for sixteen
different world regions. The farsighted stability concept of Chwe (1994)
is used and solved by combinatorial algorithms. The myopic stability
concept of d'Aspremont et al. (1983) and farsighted stability of Chwe
(1994) are discussed. Myopic stability assumes that players are myopic
while farsighted stability assumes perfect foresight of the players and
predicts which coalitions can be formed when players are farsighted.
Farsightedly stable coalitions can be frequently the largest size stable
coalition, that game theory without side payments can reach. All
farsightedly stable coaltions and their improvement to environment are
found.
Place
Lab 231
Language
Anglès
